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Automobile "Crashworthiness":
an Untenable Doctrine
Michael Hoenig* and Stephen J. Werber**
U NOBTRUSIVELY, BUT WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY, the courts are re-
jecting a theory of liability being vigorously advanced by some
members of the plaintiffs' bar with the apparent intent of opening up a
vast new source of contingent fee income. The theory, variously labelled
as "crashworthiness" or the "second collision" doctrine seeks to impose
common-law liability upon the automobile industry for injurious conse-
quences of automobile collisions despite the fact that no defect or mal-
function in the vehicle causes the mishap.
Advocates of the theory contend that the manufacturer, as well as
other sellers in the automobile distribution network, should respond in
damages to a person injured in a collision caused by his own or another's
fault for such injuries as might have been avoided or mitigated by
utilizing a vehicular design of different size, shape, construction or as-
sembly.
A sizeable body of case law is now developing on the subject and
much of this is in the form of unpublished or unofficially reported de-
cisions. These determinations, considered in conjunction with published
decisions on the question, should be brought to the attention of the prac-
titioner to avoid an apparently common misconception that only a few
courts have decided the issue. On the contrary, a great number of deci-
sions have held against the imposition of such liability for very sound
legal and policy reasons.
It is the purpose of this article to review this decisional law and
to place it in the context of important policy considerations which justify
such judicial determinations. It will be shown that the great majority of
these decisions are entirely consistent with the doctrine of "strict tort
liability" as enunciated in § 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second;
that the questions sought to be submitted to juries in these cases are
properly the subject of highly technical and complex legislative and ad-
ministrative action on both a state and federal level; and that the few
decisions seemingly holding to the contrary were based upon a fallacious
legal premise which, if accepted, would make the automobile industry
virtual insurers.
A typical claim of this variety could assume the following facts. A
snub-nosed, van type vehicle with two occupants collides with the rear
end of a flatbed truck resulting in the deaths of the van's occupants.
The evidence shows that the van was proceeding at about 50 miles per
hour at the time of impact. The vehicle was purchased used by one
of the decedents from an automobile dealer who sells both new and
used vehicles. The van is in its eleventh year of use at the time of the
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accident and was used by the decedents for almost four years prior to
the date of the mishap.
Suit is commenced against the driver and owner of the truck al-
leging that the collision was caused by the sudden action of the truck in
stopping on the highway and proceeding to ascend the highway shoulder
without proper signal. Suit is also filed against the seller and distributor
of the van vehicle upon "strict tort liability." The complaint alleges that
the vehicle was "defective" because there was no protection in front
of the passenger to prevent intrusion into the compartment during the
collision. It is also alleged that the occupants were not sufficiently pro-
tected in such collisions since the snub-nosed vehicle has only a thin
metal separation between the passenger compartment and the truck into
which the van collided.
All of the alleged "defects," without exception, relate to the van's
performance upon collision or impact with another vehicle. No
defect in the vehicle's performance while riding on the high-
way, stopping, starting or parking is alleged. No defect in its wheels,
steering, brakes, lights or any other part is charged with having caused
it to collide with the truck. In sum, the whole basis for the claim
against the automobile defendants is the charge that the eleven year old
vehicle was "unsafe" when smashed head-on into the rear of the truck.
Proponents of the so-called theory of "crashworthiness" would con-
tend that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action against the
sellers of the vehicle and the question of the vehicle's purported "de-
fectiveness" should be resolved by a jury.
On substantially similar facts, however, a Superior Court in the
State of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of the auto-
mobile sellers.' It felt constrained to grant judgment as a matter of
law for very compelling reasons. To fully appreciate the soundness of
this determination one must first resort to the initial judicial articula-
of the essential legal principles which justify such a disposition, in-
cluding similar precedents.
The natural starting point is the leading case of Evans v. General
Motors Corp.2 There the plaintiff's decedent was killed when the station
wagon he was driving was struck broadside by another vehicle. Suit
was brought against the manufacturer of the station wagon on the
theory that the frame of the car provided inadequate protection against
impact from the side. The complaint was in three counts charging:
negligence in design and testing of the station wagon, breach of implied
warranties of merchantability and of fitness for the purpose for which
the car was manufactured and strict liability of the manufacturer for
I Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, Wash. Super. Ct., Grant County, No. 19076,
Aug. 21, 1970 (unpublished). The court's reasoning is discussed infra. At the time of
publication this case was just unofficially reported in CCH N~oD. LIAe. REP. 6550.
2 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966). The car model involved
was a 1961 Chevrolet station wagon designed with an "x" frame. The accident oc-
curred in 1964 so the car was presumably used for an extended period without com-
plaint. In a separate suit filed in an Indiana state court against the driver of the
other vehicle, plaintiff alleged that the other car was being driven at a speed of
70 to 75 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Defendant-Appellee's Appendix
at 18.
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a defective and dangerous automobile. The theory underlying the com-
plaint in Evans was quite similar to the typical claim described above:
that the car was defective because it was allegedly unsafe in a colli-
sion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed agreeing with the trial court that
the action could not be maintained.
In order to determine whether the automobile manufacturer had in
any way failed to meet its obligations to the plaintiff, the Seventh Cir-
cuit examined the nature of the manufacturer's duty to users of his
product. The defendant conceded that it had a "duty to design its auto-
mobile to be reasonably fit for the purpose for which it was made, with-
out hiding defects which would make it dangerous to persons so using
it." 3 But it denied that this included a duty to make its automobile so
that users will be protected from being injured whenever such auto-
mobile strikes or is struck by other vehicles or objects. An automobile
manufacturer, the defendant contended, "is not required to design or
test the design of an automobile from the standpoint of how it may be
misused by a user or bludgeoned by outside forces while being used by
a user." 4 The Seventh Circuit agreed.
A manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile ac-
cident-proof or fool-proof; nor must he render the vehicle "more"
safe where the danger to be avoided is obvious to all.
Perhaps it would be desirable to require manufacturers to
construct automobiles in which it would be safe to collide, but that
would be a legislative function, not an aspect of judicial interpre-
tation of existing law.5
Other negligence cases involving automobiles were distinguished by
the Evans court on the ground that in all of them the facts showed that
the products involved "were unfit for their intended use and in pre-
cisely that respect were the cause of accidental injuries." 6 Per contra,
in the case before the court, the vehicle involved was not rendered unfit
for its intended use by the fact that it could not safely be employed to
collide with other vehicles.
The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its
participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufac-
turer's ability to foresee the possibility that such collisions may oc-
cur. As defendant argues, the defendant also knows that its auto-
mobiles may be driven into bodies of water, but it is not suggested
that defendant has a duty to-equip them with pontoons. 7
3 Id. at 824.
4 Brief for Appellee at 6. The defendant manufacturer cited the following case au-
thority for this contention: Poore v. Edgar Bros. Co., 90 P.2d 808, 809-10 (Cal. 1939);
Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677, 678-79 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Hatch v. Ford
Motor Co., 329 P.2d 605, 607-08 (Cal. App. 1958); and Tamburello v. Travelers In-
dernity Co., 206 F. Supp. 920, 922 (E.D. La. 1962).
5 Evans v. General Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 822, 824 (7th Cir. 1966).
6 Id. at 825.
7 Id. (Emphasis added.) These conclusions were just as fatal to the plaintiff's claims
based on implied warranty and strict liability. It could not be implied, the court said,
that defendant had warranted its automobile "to be capable of protecting a driver
in broadside collisions."
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The Evans holding is not an isolated judicial pronouncement. Many
published decisions are in accord with the result reached in that case
on this fundamental question of the automobile manufacturer's or
seller's duty.
8
Thus in Schemel v. General Motors Corp.,9 the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the dismissal of an action for personal injuries sustained by the
plaintiff when a car in which he was riding was struck in the rear by
an automobile being driven at a speed of approximately 115 miles per
hour. The plaintiff had alleged that the manufacturer negligently de-
signed, manufactured and sold a vehicle capable of being driven at
dangerous speeds on roads not designed for such speeds, thereby ex-
posing the public to excessive risks. The court held:
The automobile in question was not dangerous for the use for
which it was manufactured by its lawful use in the manner and for
the purpose for which it was supplied.' 0
A similar situation was presented in Willis v. Chrysler Corp.,"
where summary judgment was granted in favor of the defendant auto-
mobile manufacturer. As a result of a high speed collision between two
cars all the occupants were killed. The impact had caused the auto-
mobile manufactured by the defendant to break into two sections at a
point just behind the front seats. The plaintiffs charged breach of im-
plied warranty in that the vehicle's structural integrity was not main-
tained in a high speed collision. The court stated:
This court is of the opinion that the defendant had no duty to
design an automobile that could withstand a high speed collision
and maintain its structural integrity . . . This court agrees with
the Evans case that, "the intended purpose of an automobile does
not include its participation in collisions with other objects." 12
8 E.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 945 (1968); Walz v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R., CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. ff5722
(N.D. Ind. 1967); Shumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio
1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967); Walton v.
Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969); Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233
So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970); General Motors Corp. v. Howard, CCH PROD. LIAB. REP.
6498 (Miss. Sup. Ct. 1971); Keahl v. General Motors Corp., CCH PROD. LIAB. REP.
15995, 6042 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968); Snipes v. General Motors Corp., CCH PROD. LIAR.
REP. 6037 (Ohio C. P. 1968); Enders v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., CCH PROD. LIAD. ,EP.
5930 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1968). A number of other published decisions involving auto-
mobile-related injuries, though perhaps in a slightly different factual setting, are
nevertheless similarly compelling. See e.g., Muncy v. General Motors Corp., 357
S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962), followed in General Motors Corp. v. Muncy, 367
F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1966); Mondshour v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 111
(D. Md. 1969); Kahn v. Chrysler Corp., 221 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Tam-
burello v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 206 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. La. 1962); Poore v. Edgar
Bros. Co., 90 P.2d 868 (Cal. 1939); Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393,
329 P.2d 605 (1958); McNally v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 55 Misc. 2d 128, 284 N.Y.S.2d
761 (Sup. Ct. 1967). The cases cited herein involved only automobiles. Yet the
principles applied by the courts have also been applied in non-automobile cases.
See e.g., Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 95 N.E.2d 802 (1950).
9 384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967).
10 Id. at 804-05.
11 264 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
12 Id. at 1012.
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On similar grounds the court in Shumard v. General Motors Corp.13
dismissed a complaint charging an automobile manufacturer with neg-
ligence in failing to design a vehicle which was fireproof when colliding
with other cars. The plaintiff's decedent had been involved in a col-
lision with another vehicle and was killed when his automobile burst into
flames. The court stated:
No duty exists to make an automobile fireproof, nor does a
manufacturer have to make a product which is "accident-proof" or
"foolproof." 14
After reviewing the applicable authorities the court concluded:
The purpose for which a product is manufactured has reference
to its normal and proper use and not to any use.
These cases conclusively demonstrate that an automobile is not
made for the purpose of striking or being struck by other vehicles
or objects and that the duty of an automobile manufacturer does
not include the duty to design and construct an automobile which
will insure the occupants against injury no matter how it may be
misused or bludgeoned by outside forces.1'h
In Walz v. Erie-Lackawanna R.R.,16 a vehicle driven by the plain-
tiff's decedent collided with a train. The manufacturer of the auto-
mobile was named as a co-defendant and charged with negligent design
in failing to provide a vehicle which would be safe in collisions. The
United States District Court dismissed the complaint and stated:
I agree with the courts that have said that if automobile manu-
facturers are to be required to build a product safe to collide with
trains, automobiles, trees and other objects, then the requirement
should be imposed by the policy making bodies, that is, the legis-
latures, and not by the court.
17
In Walton v. Chrysler Motor Corp.18 the Supreme Court of Missis-
sippi was faced, as a case of first impression, with the "crashworthi-
ness" issue. The court had only recently adopted the strict tort liability
rule enunciated by the Second Restatement of Torts.19 The plaintiff was
injured when the automobile seat he was sitting on broke during a col-
lision with another car which had crashed into the rear end of the
plaintiff's stopped vehicle. The plaintiff contended:
that it is the duty of the manufacturer to foresee accidents, and to
design its vehicles so as to reduce the possibility of injury to the
users of their products . . . although the defect in the design of the
13 270 F. Supp. 311 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
14 Id. at 312.
15 Id. at 314.
16 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 5722 (N.D. Ind. 1967).
17 Id. at p. 7516. For other CCH-reported decisions rejecting the so-called "crash-
worthiness" theory, see Snipes v. General Motors Corp., CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 16037
(Ohio C. P. 1968) (head-on collision resulting in fatality; demurrer to complaint
sustained); Keahl v. General Motors Corp., CCH PROD. LiAB. REP. 15995, 6042 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1968) (two counts of complaint struck with decision reserved on the third).
18 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969).
19 State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966).
20 CLEV. ST. L. R. (3) Sept. 1971
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automobile did not cause the accident, but added to the serious-
ness or gravity of the injury.2
After reviewing the decisional law on the subject, the Walton
court concluded:
Our study of the authorities (cases, texts and law articles) has led
us to the conclusion that the great weight of authority is against
the theory presented by the appellant.21
A particularly well-reasoned decision was rendered by the Wis-
consin state court in Enders v. Volkswagenwerk A. G., 22 an action based
upon an alleged failure of the design of a small Volkswagen automobile
to withstand a head-on collision. In dismissing the complaint, the court
took judicial notice that the Volkswagen was an inexpensive, light, com-
pact automobile and held:
When a G.M.C. tractor and a Mack tractor in head-on collisions
do not furnish enough protection to prevent deaths of the respective
drivers [citation omitted], to impose the duty of preparing inexpen-
sive cars against head-on collisions seems beyond the realm of sen-
sible public policy ...
It must have been perfectly clear to the plaintiff when he
bought the car here in question that if he had a head-on collision
with a heavier vehicle he would probably come off second best and
that it was likely that he and his passenger probably would be
seriously injured. He needed no warning when he bought a Volks-
wagen that a head-on collision in such a small car would be very
hazardous. 23
The foregoing line of published judicial precedents has been joined
by a rapidly growing body of unpublished or unofficially reported deci-
sions, many of which were rendered in jurisdictions which have adopted
20 Walton v. Chrysler Corp. 229 So. 2d 568, 572 (Miss. 1969).
21 Id. The Mississippi Supreme Court thereafter followed the rule it had established
in Walton in two later cases.
In Ford Motor Co. v. Simpson, 233 So. 2d 797 (Miss. 1970), the court held that an
automobile manufacturer was not liable to an occupant of a motor vehicle involved
in a head-on collision with another vehicle for injuries allegedly sustained when the
plaintiff's knee came into contact with a heater knob attached to the bottom of the
dashboard in the vehicle in which he was travelling. The plaintiff had asserted that
the placement of the heater knob was a design defect. The court stated, as had the
Seventh Circuit in Evans and Schemel, that the imposition of a duty on a manufac-
turer to make an automobile safe in a head-on collision is a legislative rather than
a judicial function.
In General Motors Corp. v. Howard, CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 6498 (Miss. 1971),
the case arose from a collision between a pickup truck and a tractor-trailer. The
driver of the truck claimed that the manufacturer was under a duty to equip its
vehicles so as to minimize injuries resulting from such collisions. The court reversed
a plaintiff's verdict and entered judgment for the manufacturer.
22 CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 5930 (Wis. Cir. Ct. 1968).
23 Id. at p. 8311. The court's opinion is a model of persuasive judicial reasoning. The
court recognized the nature and characteristics of the Volkswagen as a car of light
construction and miniature size. Id. at pp. 8310-11. It further recognized the specula-
tive nature of the plaintiff's claim and the difficulty of enunciating how far a vehicle
must be protected against collisions, noting that even huge vehicles in collisions
yield injuries and fatalities. Id. at p. 8311. The court noted moreover that the danger
of a collision in the vehicle was open, apparent and obvious. Id. The court further
observed that state public policy, as reflected in statutory enactments on required
safety equipment and the manner of operation of vehicles, did not include the
alleged duty contended. Id. It additionally found that the same result should obtain
under the strict tort liability rule. Id. at pp. 8311-12. Finally, the court refused to
"legislate" in order to impose a duty heretofore non-existent. Id. at p. 8311.
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/16
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the doctrine of strict tort liability. These unreported cases have likewise
held that the manufacturer or seller is not liable as a matter of law on
the purported theory of "crashworthiness" where the vehicle's alleged
design defects did not cause or contribute to the cause of the accident.
2 4
Reference to the facts and holdings of some of these cases is appropriate.
Biavaschi v. Frost 2 involved a suit by occupants of a Corvette ve-
hicle which was hit in the rear by another car. The Corvette's gas tank
exploded, severely injuring the driver and passenger. Dismissing the
complaint upon motion, the New Jersey court, after reviewing prior
judicial precedents, held that an automobile manufacturer had no duty
to provide an automobile in which it was safe to collide. The court
reasoned that "no liability follows" where the alleged faulty design
"was not a proximate cause of the accident which caused the injuries
complained of." It further stated:
Where the resulting danger is one arising from outside sources
rather than from an inherent danger in an article itself, liability
cannot be imposed upon the manufacturer.
The court pointed out that New Jersey law was in accord with the
weight of authority in other jurisdictions:
[T]he holdings of Evans and Shumard ... reflect the majority
view and are consonant with the law of New Jersey and should be
relied on in deciding the nature of the duty owed by the manu-
facturer.
Likewise, in Burnet v. General Motors Corp.,26 the plaintiff con-
tended that the steering column of her 1961 Chevrolet Corvair was de-
fectively designed and that by reason thereof serious injuries were sus-
tained when she drove her vehicle into a tree. U. S. District Judge
Coolahan granted the motion of the manufacturer for a directed verdict,
stating:
24 Billhartz v. Alpha Asphalt Corp., No. 67-6991 (111. Cir. Ct. St. Clair County, Apr.
21, 1969); Edgar v. Nachman (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Saratoga County, June 29, 1970); Burk-
hard v. Short, No. 18399 (Ohio C.P. Williams County, Jan. 7, 1971); Tuor v. Seattle
No. 717006 (Wash. Super. Ct. King County, Apr. 16, 1971); Devine v. Crumley,
No. 194794 (Wash. Super. Ct. Pierce County, Feb. 16, 1971); Seattle-First Nat'l Bank
v. Tabert, No. 19076 (Wash. Super. Ct. Grant County, Aug. 21, 1970); Mickendrow v.
U. S. Homes & Dev. Corp., Dkt. No. L-35295-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ocean County,
May 21, 1970); Biavaschi v. Frost, Dkt. No. L-37763-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. Bergen
County, June 5, 1970); Burnet v. General Motors Corp., Dkt. No. 833-66 (D.N.J.,
June 3, 1969). At the time of publication the Edgar, Burkhard, Seattle-First Nat'l
Bank, and Biovaschi decisions were just unofficially reported in CCH PROD. LIAB.
REP., at 1 6548, 6549, 6550 and 6547, respectively. The Edgar case was unanimously
affirmed by the N.Y. Appellate Division, 3d Dep't., June 28, 1971.
25 No. L-37763-67 (NJ. Super. Ct. Bergen County, June 5, 1970). The court's anal-
ysis parallels that made by the Wisconsin court in the Enders case, supra note 23
and accompanying text. After considering applicable legal precedents, the court
noted that "several obvious advantages" make legislative establishment of design
standards preferable to those created by the courts. "Independent research can give
a regulatory body a better understanding of design complexity than judges and
juries are able to achieve through expert testimony. Standards promulgated by an
administrative body also provide a measure of uniformity and certainty with regard
to future application." Now unofficially reported in CCH PROD. LIAB. REP., at 1 6547.
26 No. 833-66 (D.N.J., June 3, 1969). It is interesting to observe that although the
vehicle complained of was a 1961 model, the accident occurred in January of 1966.
Does not the use of the vehicle successfully for a number of years and over many
thousands of miles in and of itself go a long way towards showing that the vehicle
is safe for "normal handling" and, therefore, not "defective?"
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971
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The intended use of an automobile does not include, as I think
we understand it in the law of New Jersey, its participation in col-
lisions with other objects, even though the manufacturer might have
foreseen the possibility of such collision.
27
Another unpublished New Jersey decision, Mickendrow v. U. S.
Homes & Development Corp.,28 reached a similar conclusion in favor of
the manufacturer, the court concluding that the question of a manu-
facturer's or seller's duty to provide a "crashproof" or "safer" vehicle
was not a matter to be submitted for jury determination but a question
of law for the court.
The Washington case 29 described earlier involving collision of the
van vehicle with the rear end of a truck is instructive. The court granted
summary judgment stating from the bench:
In other words, we have here a case where the automobile had
been driven 150,000 miles with no problem whatsoever that we
know of. And, also, there is nothing latent about the construction
of the front-end of this automobile that I can see. In other words,
I think you can see the front of it and you can look under it when
you get in and take your seat; you know what your feet are on and
you know what is in front of you. And it appears to me that the
accident and the death of these people here was due to the manner
in which the automobile was being driven at the time of the acci-
dent.3 0
27 Reference to New Jersey law is most important in both the Biavaschi and Burnet
determinations. This is because the case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,
32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), is the acknowledged landmark decision in the United
States holding a manufacturer "strictly liable" for product defects. Resort to the
opinion in Henningsen confirms that the Biavaschi and Burnet determinations are
consistent with New Jersey law. Thus, in Henningsen, where a new automobile
travelling down a highway veered sharply to the right and crashed into a brick wall,
the manufacturer was held liable because the evidence was "adequate to raise an
inference that the car was defective and that such condition was causally related to
the mishap." 32 N.J. at 409, 161 A.2d at 97 [Emphasis added]. The court further
observed that there was nothing in the proof to indicate that the accident was caused
by the driver's operation of the vehicle. "Nor," said the court, "is there anything to
suggest that any external force or condition unrelated to the manufacturing or
servicing of the car operated as an inducing or even concurring factor." 32 N.J. at
410, 161 A.2d at 98. Subsequent New Jersey decisions also indicate that the duty
sought to be imposed would not be consonant with New Jersey law. Thus, in
Courtois v. General Motors Corp., 37 N.J. 525, 182 A.2d 545 (1962), a truck-tractor
from which a wheel had come off collided with a truck. Citing Henningsen the court
stated, "proof of a defect, however, is not alone sufficient to justify a recovery of
damages; it must also appear that the defect was an efficient, producing cause of the
mishap." 37 N.J. at 542, 547, 182 A.2d at 554, 556-57. See also Maiorino v. Weco
Prods. Co., 45 NJ. 570, 214 A.2d 18 (1965) (manufacturer or seller entitled to
expect a normal use of his product).
28 No. L-35295-67 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ocean County, May 21, 1970). The case involved
a small, imported car which was subjected first to a rear end collision by a pickup
truck which then propelled the car into the opposing lane of traffic where it was
smashed head-on by a vehicle proceeding in the opposite direction. Once again it
is interesting to note that the small vehicle, allegedly defective because it failed to
prevent injury in the two collisions, had been used prior to the accident for nearly
eleven years. The plaintiff driver purchased the car from his father only some nine
months before the accident and in that span operated the automobile over 10,000
to 15,000 miles.
29 Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, No. 19076 (Wash. Super. Ct. Grant County,
Aug. 21, 1970). The facts were extensively detailed in the text preceding note 1.
Now unofficially reported in CCH PROD. LiAD. REP., 6550.
30 The Washington court found persuasive the opinion and conclusions of the New
Jersey court in Biavaschi v. Frost, cited note 25, supra, and quoted from it exten-
sively.
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Two additional unpublished decisions by Washington state courts
confirm the determination made in the Seattle-First case involving the
van vehicle.3 '
Likewise, an appellate court in New York,32 and courts in Ohio3' 3 and
Illinois34 have held as a matter of law in favor of the defendant manu-
facturers or sellers.
31 Devine v. Crumley, No. 194794 (Wash. Super. Ct. Pierce County, Feb. 16, 1971);
Tuor v. Seattle, No. 717006 (Wash. Super. Ct. King County, Apr. 16, 1971). In the
Devine case a small Volkswagen sedan allegedly failed to minimize injuries sustained
in a collision with a heavier vehicle. The court granted summary judgment in
favor of the Volkswagen importer, adopting as its opinion the ten basic reasons for
judgment as a matter of law which were summarized in the defendant's brief. These
reasons were essentially as follows:
(1) A manufacturer is not required to make an accident-proof or foolproof car;
(2) A manufacturer is not required to make his cars "more safe" where the
danger to be avoided, i.e., collisions, is obvious to all;
(3) The normal intended use of an automobile does not include its participation
in collisions;
(4) Such design requirements are a legislative and not a judicial function-
(5) Juries are not properly to be the arbiters of design questions not involving
collision causation;
(6) A manufacturer or seller is not an insurer;
(7) Imposition of such a duty retrospectively is beyond the realm of sensible
public policy;
(8) A duty to minimize injuries in collisions would be indefinable because of
the myriad number and varieties of such occurrences;
(9) No duty exists to adopt every conceivable safety device;
(10) Such claims do not allege defects which proximately caused the accident.
The Devine court also analogized to motorcycles as vehicles offering little or no
protection against the dangers of collisions. "For example, if the rule contended by
plaintiff was adopted, it would eliminate all motorcycles from the highways, and
that might be a desirable result. But the law cannot enforce that to be done."
In the Tuor v. Seattle case, a twelve year old Chevrolet Corvette left the road-
way and struck a fire hydrant early on a rainy morning. The collision resulted in
the death of the driver and injuries to the passenger. The car had been modified
extensively to enhance its performance as a powerful sports car. Plaintiff claimed
that the vehicle was improperly designed and built from materials which shattered
on impact. It was also alleged that the construction caused the driver's leg to be
wedged in during the collision and that the fuel tank ruptured. There was evidence
that the driver had been drinking. The court granted summary judgment in favor
of the manufacturer on the ground that the alleged faulty design did not cause the
event which resulted in injury. The court further reasoned that the duty sought to
be imposed was one for the legislature to impose, not the courts. It was also noted
that the weight of the case law was against the imposition of such a duty.
32 Edgar v. Nachman, -_ App. Div. 2d _ N.Y.S. 2d _- (3d Dep't, June 28, 1971),
Affirming CCH PROD. LIAB. REP. 6548. The case involved a head-on collision at high
speed between a small imported car and a heavier vehicle crossing over onto the
wrong side of the road. A fire ensued and it was claimed that the smaller vehicle
failed to protect against the collision consequences. The vehicle at the time of the
accident had been in use nearly six years. The manufacturer and sellers moved to
dismiss the complaint and this motion was granted. The lower court stated that
"plaintiff here is seeking an extension of responsibility that transcends the cause of
an accident's happening and moves to a subsequent occurrence which aggravates the
injury or damage without being involved in or responsible for the original happen-
ing. To succeed in that direction seems to call for appeal, persuasion and argument
to the Legislature rather than the Courts." The lower court quoted extensively from
the earlier New York Court of Appeals decision of Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468,
95 N.E.2d 802 (1950), which, in turn, had been relied upon by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Evans v. General Motors Corp., cited in note 2 and accompanying
text. The Appellate Division also relied upon Campo stating that the manufacturer
"is not required to make a machine that is accident proof or a car that is crash-
worthy." In Campo, the New York court stated that the manufacturer "is under no
duty to render a machine or other article 'more' safe-as long as the danger to be
avoided is obvious and patent to all."
83 Burkhard v. Short, No. 18399 (Ohio CR. Williams County, Jan. 7, 1971) now
unofficially reported in CCH. The case involved an intersection collision in which
plaintiff alleged defective design in such a manner that she was thrown forward into
the cowl of the vehicle upon impact. It was not contended that the alleged design
(Continued on next page)
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There are some cases which apparently look the other way. 5 The
most notable of these decisions which attempts to articulate a theory
of liability is Larsen v. General Motors Corp.36 The plaintiff alleged
that the steering column of the automobile protruded some 2.7 inches
forward of the leading surface of the front tires and that this constituted
negligent design because it greatly enhanced the danger to the driver in
a collision. The trial court granted the manufacturer summary judg-
ment.3 7 This determination was reversed on appeal.
Although the Eighth Circuit conceded that "automobiles are not
made for the purpose of colliding with each other," it nevertheless con-
cluded that automobile manufacturers should be liable for alleged de-
sign defects which are claimed to aggravate the consequences of acci-
dent because
Collisions with or without fault of the user are clearly foresee-
able by the manufacturer and are statistically inevitable.3 s
The chief case relied on by the court, Ford Motor Co. v. Zahn,39 was
misconstrued since Zahn involved an allegedly defective component part;
(Continued from preceding page)
defect in any way caused the occurrence. The court granted the manufacturer's mo-
tion for summary judgment holding that the vehicle's intended use did not include its
collision with other "vehicular impediments," that the definition of design standards
was a matter "peculiarly and exclusively within the legislative province" and that
there is no cause of action for alleged faulty design which does not "proximately con-
tribute to the cause of the accident which produces the injury-causing impact."
34 Billhartz v. Alpha Asphalt Corp., No. 67-6991 (Ill. Cir. Ct. St. Clair County, Apr.
21, 1969). Plaintiff alleged that the defendant Ford Motor Company defectively
designed the door latches on a 1964 vehicle which left the pavement and overturned.
As a result of the upset and impact, plaintiff claimed, the driver's door opened and
she was thrown from the vehicle. The court granted the manufacturer's motion to
dismiss the counts of the amended complaint directed to it. Defendant's brief had
relied upon the Evans case and also upon Gossett v. Chrysler Corp., 359 F.2d 84 (6th
Cir. 1966).
35 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); Grundmanis v.
British Motors Corp. Ltd., 308 F. Supp. 303 (E.D. Wis. 1970); Mickle v. Blackmon,
166 S.E.2d 173 (S.C. 1969). An intermediate appellate court of California reached a
similar result in Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr.
305 (3rd Dist. 1970). However, said decision is in conflict with the holding of a co-
ordinate court in Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 393, 329 P.2d 605 (2d
Dist. 1958), although the Badorek court stated that Hatch was distinguishable on its
facts. 11 Cal. App. 3d at 923, 90 Cal. Rptr. at 318. In any event, subsequent pro-
cedural events in the Badorek case negate the decision both as a judgment and a
precedent under California law. The Supreme Court of California granted a hearing
in Badorek on January 14, 1971. See 90 Cal. Reptr. at 305. Under California law the
grant of a hearing by the Supreme Court abrogates the Court of Appeals decision as
judgment or precedent. E.g., Ponce v. Marr, 47 Cal.2d 159, 161, 301 P.2d 837, 839
(1956). After retransfer to the intermediate appellate court for reconsideration be-
fore Supreme Court consideration, the Badorek case was dismissed by agreement of
the parties. The Oregon case of Storey v. Exhaust Specialties & Parts, Inc., 464 P.2d
831 (Ore. 1970), although disapproving of a trial court's instruction taken from the
Evans case, involved merely a claim that an accident was caused by an alleged
weakness in the manufacture and design of automobile wheels. The South Carolina
decision in Mickle, supra, involved a deteriorated gearshift knob in a thirteen year
old car so that it is much closer on its facts to manufacturing defect cases like Ford
Motor Co. v. Zahn, 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959), or choice of material cases, rather
than "crashworthiness" design cases. In Grundmanis, supra, the U.S. District Judge
ignored the fact that the law of Wisconsin had already been established, contrary to
its decision, in Enders v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., CCH PaOD. LIAB. REP. 15930 (Wis.
Cir. Ct. 1968).
36 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
37 274 F. Supp. 461 (D. Minn. 1967).
38 Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968).
39 265 F.2d 729 (8th Cir. 1959).
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it was not a case of alleged defective design. So, too, the court miscon-
strued the legal concept of "foreseeability" erroneously equating it with
the concept of "duty."
The basic assumption of Larsen was that liability should be co-
extensive with foreseeability. This assumption is fallacious. Actually,
foreseeability is only one limited factor in determining "duty." As a
noted authority on tort law, Dean Leon Green, has written:
[H]owever valuable the foreseeability formula may be in aiding a
jury or judge to reach a decision on the negligence issue, it is alto-
gether inadequate for use by the judge as a basis of determining the
duty issue and its scope. The duty issue, being one of law, is broad
in its implications; the negligence issue is confined to the particular
case and has no implications for other cases. There are many
factors other than foreseeability that may condition a judge's im-
posing or not imposing a duty in the particular case, but the only
factors for the jury to consider in determining the negligence issue
are expressed in the foreseeability formula.40
The principle that liability or "duty" is distinct from foreseeability
has been clearly recognized in cases throughout the country. Foresee-
ability alone as a basis for a finding of "duty" has been rejected4 1 and
with good reason. As applied to the so-called "crashworthiness" issue,
the court must decide what elements in addition to foreseeability will
40 Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401, 1417-18 (1961)
(Emphasis added). If the foreseeability formula "were the only basis of determining
both duty and its violation," states Dean Green, "such activities as some types of
athletics, medical services, construction enterprises, manufacture and use of chem-
icals and explosives, serving of intoxicating liquors, operation of automobiles and
airplanes, and many others would be greatly restricted." Id. at 1418.
41 E.g., Tobin v. Grossman, 24 N.Y.2d 609, 249 N.E.2d 419 (1969); Goldberg v. Hous-
ing Authority, 38 N.J. 578, 186 A.2d 291 (1962); Amaya v. Home Ice Fuel & Supplies
Corp., 59 Cal.2d 295, 309 (1963). In Tobin, the New York court held that no cause of
action existed for unintended harm sustained by one solely as a result of injuries
inflicted directly upon another. The case involved a mother's claim for mental and
physical injuries caused by shock and fear for her child who suffered serious injuries
in an automobile accident. To resolve the issue of "duty," said the court, "the many
converging policy factors must be considered." Foreseeability was only one such
factor and could not be deemed dispositive. 24 N.Y,2d at 615. "If forseeability be
the sole test, then once liability is extended the logic of the principle would not and
could not be confined." Id. at 616.
In the Goldberg case, the New Jersey Supreme Court dismissed a claim against
the operator of a public housing development brought by a tradesman who had been
attacked and robbed in the development by unknown persons. Plaintiff contended
that an attack of this type was foreseeable and a duty existed to protect against it in
the form of police protection. In finding no such duty as a matter of law, the court
stated:
"The question whether a private party must provide protection for another
is not solved merely by recourse to 'foreseeability.' Everyone can foresee the
commission of crime virtually anywhere and at any time, If foreseeability itself
gave rise to a duty to provide 'police' protection for others, every residential
curtilage, every shop, every store, every manufacturing plant would have to be
patrolled by the private arms of the owner. And since hijacking and attack
upon occupants of motor vehicles are also foreseeable, it would be the duty of
every motorist to provide armed protection for his passengers and the property
of others. Of course, none of this is at all palatable.
The question is not simply whether a criminal event is foreseeable, but
whether a duty exists to take measures to guard against it. Whether a duty
exists is ultimately a question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of
the relationship of the parties, the nature of the risk, and the public interest in
the proposed solution." 38 N.J. at 583, 186 A.2d at 293.
See also FLEMING, LAw oF TORTS 140 (2d ed. 1961) (foreseeability not condition prece-
dent or test by which existence of duty is inferred).
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create a duty.42 If foreseeability were the sole test of duty, following
Dean Green's exposition,43 any person cut by a knife would have an
action against the knife manufacturer, and a person falling from a
bicycle or roller skates, or injured while riding a motorcycle or a
scooter could have recourse against the respective manufacturers. These
examples could be multiplied by the thousands.
44
Looking only to automobiles it is foreseeable that there will be
front-end, rear-end, sideward, high speed and low speed accidents, be-
cause drivers become drowsy, become intoxicated and suffer failing eye-
sight. It is foreseeable that there will be accidents because roads are
narrow and have curves, hills and valleys. It is foreseeable that there
will be accidents with heavy trucks or trains or with bicycles or
pedestrians. Measures taken to avoid the consequences of some of
these accidents will necessarily aggravate the consequences of other
accidents. In some cases charges will be made that automobiles are too
high powered, in others that the power was too low. Some will claim
that vehicles are too small to absorb impacts. Automobile manufacturers
would truly be called upon to be insurers.
The proliferation of the types of claims reflected by the foregoing
decisions reveals that no particular type of vehicle is being singled
out. The claims involve small sports cars, economy compacts, station
wagons, van-type vehicles, intermediate sedans, luxury cars and even
trucks. No particular type of collision limits the claimants' field of
criticism. The claims are filed whether the collision is from the front,
rear, side and even the top.45 There is no limitation on the types of
objects being collided with. The claims include collisions with other
cars, trees, poles, bridge abutments and even railroad trains. The speeds
at which the collisions occurred ranged as high as 115 miles per hour.
The vehicles were criticized as "defective" despite the fact that many
42 Both Evans and Larsen are in accord that the question of duty in the design of
an automobile is a question of law for the court. Evans v. General Motors Corp.,
supra note 2, 359 F.2d at 824; Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d at 498.
43 Supra note 40 and accompanying text.
44 See Jamieson v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 26 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. de-
nied, 355 U.S. 857 (1957); Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472 (1950).
45 See Dyson v. General Motors Corp., 298 F. Supp. 1064 (E.D. Pa. 1969). A 1965
hardtop convertible left the roadway and overturned. Plaintiff contended that the
severity of her injuries was enhanced by the failure of the roof to support, even
partially, the weight of the overturned car. The court denied defendant's motion
to dismiss, holding that a Pennsylvania court, under the facts of that case, would
not preclude imposition of liability as a matter of law. The court did indicate its
accord with the general weight of authority in a true crash situation by stating:
"Of course, the law does not impose any such obligation [duty to manufacture a
'crashproof' automobile] .... If, for example, a vehicle left the roadway acci-
dentally and came to rest in a river, it could scarcely be argued that the man-
ufacturer should have produced an automobile which would float. Similarly, it
could not reasonably be argued that a car manufacturer should be held liable
because its vehicle collapsed when involved in a head-on collision with a large
truck, at high speed." Id. at 1073.
Although the court considered the Evans and Larsen decisions as well as others, it
never adopted Larsen as precedent, simply referring to it as a case upon which
plaintiff relied. It would be erroneous to categorize Dyson as a "crashworthiness"
decision beyond the specific facts of that case as the above-quoted language
indicates.
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were used without mishap for many years. In essence, therefore, the
claimants in these cases were suing upon an unrealizable ideal: a
"crashproof" car. This constituted an invitation to a jury to make the
manufacturer pay in any case.
By submitting to a jury the vague and undefinable issues of crash
protection, the Eighth Circuit in Larsen abdicated its responsibility to
decide questions of law and to submit to juries only questions of fact.
After remand and trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict in favor
of the defendant.40 The jury's verdict, in a sense, cured the Larsen
court's error in that case.
The vagueness of the concept of foreseeability dictates that it be
employed cautiously. That automobile collisions are "foreseeable" must
be conceded. But if foreseeability were to be the exclusive test, then
an automobile manufacturer and seller would likely be proper party
defendants whenever an automobile accident resulted in injury to an
occupant of the vehicle involved. Nearly every accident situation, no
matter how bizarre, is "foreseeable" if only because in the last fifty years
drivers have discovered just about every conceivable way of wrecking
an automobile. To base liability on foreseeability alone is to invite
improvisations by juries or even by courts on an ad hoc basis. The
mischief which would result therefrom is enormous.
47
The rejection of the so-called "crashworthiness" theory by the
weight of authority is amply buttressed by the comments to § 402A of
the Restatement of Torts, Second.48 Keeping in mind the "typical" claim
made by proponents of the theory, as for example, the van to truck
collision described earlier,49 let us consider the relevant comments.
Thus, Comment g to § 402A states:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product
is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not con-
templated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably
dangerous to him. The seller is not liable when he delivers the
product in a safe condition, and subsequent mishandling or other
causes make it harmful by the time it is consumed.
In the case of the van to truck collision, does not the prior use of
the van vehicle for nearly eleven years by the plaintiffs and others
demonstrate vividly that the vehicle was "delivered in a safe condition"
and that "subsequent mishandling or other causes" caused the collision?
The other comments to § 402A are equally clear that the doctrine
is not meant to cover this type of case. Comment h states:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for
normal handling and consumption. If the injury results from ab-
normal handling, as where a bottled beverage is knocked against a
46 See Bowman, Defense of an Auto Design Negligence Case, 10 FoR THE DEFENSE
No. 5 (May, 1969).
47 A recent case in California involved a Falcon automobile which caught fire after
being rear-ended by a Buick. Plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturers of both
cars, alleging defective design of the Falcon for location of the gas tank in the rear
of the car and defective design of the Buick for too pointy or protruding a front end.
48 Section 402A is the touchstone of the strict tort liability doctrine.
49 Supra note 1 and the preceding text.
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radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal preparation for use, as
where too much salt is added to food, or from abnormal consump-
tion, as where a child eats too much candy and is made ill, the
seller is not liable.
In the case of the van to truck collision, the prior injury-free use of
the van vehicle for eleven years shows that it was a product "safe for
normal handling" and therefore not "in a defective condition." The col-
lision of the van at high speed into the rear end of the truck was as
much a result of "abnormal handling" as a bottle "knocked against a
radiator."
Comment i describes what is meant by the term "unreasonably
dangerous":
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective
condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer. Many products cannot possibly be made en-
tirely safe for all consumption, and any food or drug necessarily in-
volves some risk of harm, if only from overconsumption. Ordinary
sugar is a deadly poison to diabetics, and castor oil found use under
Mussolini as an instrument of torture. That is not what is meant
by "unreasonably dangerous" in this Section. The article sold must
be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contem-
plated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary
knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. .... 50
In the case of the. van to truck collision it was perfectly clear to
anyone that the van vehicle could not "possibly be made entirely safe
for all consumption" including collisions with trucks at high speed.
The vehicle clearly involved "some risk of harm" if subjected to a col-
lision. Thus, it was not "unreasonably dangerous" within § 402A.
And Comment j notes:
[A] seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or in-
gredients in them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so,
when consumed in excessive quantity, or over a long period of
time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known
and recognized. Again the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an
example, as are also those of foods containing such substances as
saturated fats, which may over a period of time have a deleterious
effect upon the human heart.
In the case of the van to truck collision it was certainly not neces-
sary to warn the purchasers or users of an eleven year old van vehicle
of the "danger or potentiality of danger" in collisions because the danger
"is generally known and recognized" by all.
These comments reveal convincingly that the "crashworthiness"
50 The comment continues:
"Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will make some
people drunk, and is especially dangerous to alcoholics; but bad whiskey, con-
taining a dangerous amount of fusel oil, is unreasonably dangerous. Good to-
bacco is not unreasonably dangerous merely because the effects of smoking may
be harmful; but tobacco containing something like marijuana may be un-
reasonably dangerous. Good butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely be-
cause, if such be the case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to
heart attacks; but bad butter, contaminated with poisonous fish oil, is un-
reasonably dangerous."
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theory is beyond the sensible purview of § 402A on strict tort liability.
Though we have used the "typical" example of the van to truck col-
lision, the same principles could be shown to apply in virtually all of
the collision cases referred to earlier.
5
'
One of the strong arguments running through the numerous cases
holding against submission to a jury of the question whether an auto-
mobile should have been designed to minimize the consequences of a
collision not caused by the matters complained of is that the legislature,
through agencies created for the purpose, is better able to weigh the
various problems involved in how vehicular design might be changed
to minimize the consequences of a particular collision.
The obligation which the cases recognize as imposing upon a
manufacturer to produce a car reasonably fit for the purpose for which
it is sold, i.e., the transportation of persons and property, is an objective
standard. The manufacturer knows what he is required to do and a
jury can determine whether or not he has succeeded. The duty which
the proponents of "crashworthiness" seek to impose, to build a car in
which it is "safe" or "reasonably safe" to smash into other vehicles, in-
vites the jury to speculate retrospectively about what "safety" in col-
lisions means.
The word "safe" when applied to automobile collisions is a com-
pletely fluid term without meaning. How safe? In collisions with what
kinds of vehicles? Small cars, large cars, trucks, railroad trains? At
what speeds, 20 mph, 60 mph, 80 mph?
Furthermore, what other desirable characteristics are to be sacri-
ficed in pursuit of "greater" safety? Is the consumer to be denied the
right to purchase a relatively low-cost, economical and maneuverable
vehicle in favor of an expensive, armored tank? Are the owners of
convertibles to be denied the pleasure of open-air driving because in up-
sets they are more vulnerable than the occupants of hardtops? What
should be stressed in terms of the various factors which affect the safety
of a vehicle: speed, driver visibility, economy, maneuverability, defense
armor? The jury would first have to fix the standard, then determine
whether the automobile, as designed, meets this newly-minted criterion.
Plainly, questions of this character are not appropriate for decision
by a jury. A legislative body is equipped to evaluate all the pertinent
considerations and lay down objective standards for prospective applica-
tion. A jury whose verdict operates only retrospectively cannot do
either. Focusing upon the specific accident before it, it will necessarily
forget the myriad others and base its verdict solely upon what hind-
sight in the particular circumstances may show would have been
"safer." The plaintiff in the particular lawsuit may benefit, but the in-
terests of the general public will not be served and may even be
prejudiced. As one of the most articulate exponents of auto safety
points out:
51 It is significant to observe that many of the courts which rejected the "crash-
worthiness" doctrine as a matter of law were in jurisdictions where strict tort liabil-
ity or implied warranty without privity had been adopted.
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[J]udicially induced reform would of necessity be episodic and dis-
organized, dependent on the fortuitous circumstances of individual
law suits. . . . The imposition of safety standards on the auto-
mobile industry can most likely be achieved better by a consistent
application of regulatory standards drawn up by experts and kept
current by research, rather than by ad hoe decisions of inexpert
judges and juries.5 2
Without a legal standard fixed objectively a manufacturer cannot
ascertain what he must do to satisfy the law. Only the legislature can
fix such a standard in advance. It can balance conflicting considera-
tions and decide what should be properly sacrificed in terms of other
consumer values and what should not be in the interests of a com-
pletely "safe" automobile.
Congress has acted to provide such standards by adoption of the
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966.5 3 Significantly the
Act itself defines a "motor vehicle safety standard" as one "which is
practicable, which meets the need for motor vehicle safety and which
provides objective criteria." 54
Under the authority of this statute the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration has promulgated and is continuously amending
and perfecting motor vehicle safety standards which provide objective
criteria so that manufacturers will know what they must build into
their cars to protect their occupants from the negligent and reckless
conduct of themselves and other persons.5 5 These motor vehicle safety
52 O'Connell, Taming the Automobile, 58 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 299, 375 (1963).
See also Hatch v. Ford Motor Co., suggesting that submission of such questions to
juries would make "the triers of the facts . . . the arbiters of the design of auto-
mobiles and the standard of design would be determined not when the automobile
was manufactured but after the occurrence of an accident." 163 Cal. App. 2d at 397-
98, 329 P.2d at 608.
53 15 U.S.C., § 1381 et seq (Supp. IV 1969).
54 15 U.S.C., § 1391(2) (Supp. IV 1969).
55 "Traffic safety is a complex and intricate subject matter involving many variables
in the relationship of the vehicle, the driver, the highway, and a constantly shift-
ing environment." S. REP. No. 1302, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in
1966-2 U. S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2755.
In a report of the House Public Works Committee on Highway Safety it was noted
that statistics indicated clearly that alcohol was a substantial factor in about 50 per-
cent of all automobile accidents. H. R. REP. No. 1700, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1966).
A prominent proponent of automobile safety, Jeffrey O'Connell, has pointed out
that "there is no question that better roads means fewer accidents." O'CONNELL &
MYERS, SAFETY LAST 97 (1966). The Senate Public Works Committee found, for ex-
ample, that treatment of road surfaces resulted in significant success in reducing
accidents caused by skidding on wet pavements. "Grooving" of the pavement at key
locations also reduced skidding accidents. S. REP. No. 1302, 89th Cong. 2d Sess.
(1966), reprinted in 1966-2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2746. The Committee
noted that improved road illumination saved lives. Id. at 2745-46. The same Com-
mittee found that beginning drivers were associated with accidents to a greater
degree than experienced drivers and called for better driver education efforts. Id. at
2747. Another factor affecting automotive safety is impaired functions of some
24,000,000 Americans. O'CoNN-LL & MYERS, SAFETY LAST, at 80 (1966). Research
showed that some 30 percent of accidents causing death and serious injuries were
caused by tire failures. O'CoNNELL & MYERS, SAFETY LAST, at 198 (1966). If anything
is clear from the foregoing, it is that traffic safety is a technical and complex subject
which requires efforts in reducing the causes of accidents on a massive scale.
O'CONNELL & MYERS, SAFETY LAST, at 131 (1966). To impose liability upon the auto-
mobile industry for failing to minimize collision consequences where the mishap is
not caused by any defect or malfunction in the vehicle is to have that industry
underwrite the cost of accidents. The common law cannot impose such a duty; only
the legislature can.
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standards are published in the Code of Federal Regulations.56 They in-
clude provisions designed to provide for occupant protection in the
event of collisions. However, they do so with adequate controls, planning,
testing and expert opinion. The standards present objective criteria.
The National Highway Safety Bureau is also charged with re-
sponsibility for conducting a program relating to automobile defects and
recall campaigns. Auto manufacturers must notify owners of safety
related defects discovered in their vehicles, and inform the Secretary
of Transportation of such defects, what safety hazards are involved, and
what steps are being taken to recall the vehicles and remedy the de-
fects.
A second law, the Highway Safety Act of 1966,57 authorizes the
Highway Safety Bureau to issue standards for developing, improving
and expanding a wide variety of state and local highway safety pro-
grams. These standards involve periodic motor vehicle inspection, motor
vehicle registration, driver licensing and driver education, motorcycle
safety, traffic records, courts and laws, alcohol in relation to highway
safety, emergency medical services for highway crash victims, police
traffic services, pedestrian safety, and others. Under these programs
the Federal agency engages in broad-scale research, testing, and de-
velopment programs designed to obtain basic data on motor vehicles and
their performance, on drivers and their performance, and on other
factors in the driving environment. In effect, the Federal government
has moved forcefully into the area of automotive and highway safety
with a comprehensive and balanced legislative program.
State legislation has also been enacted with a view to increasing
automotive safety. States have adopted the Vehicle Equipment Safety
Compact which, among other things, provides for regulation of auto-
motive equipment which affects the "safety" of a vehicle's operation or
the "safety" of its occupants.58 It is evident, therefore, that the com-
56 49 C.F.R. Part 571. Standards already in effect prescribe safety performance levels
for windshield wiping, washing, defrosting, and defogging systems, brakes and brake
hoses, lamps, reflective devices, and associated equipment, tires and rims, door
latches and hinges, seat anchorages, safety belts, energy absorbing steering columns,
head restraints, new laminated windshields, fuel tanks and fittings, and many others.
The uniformity of the standards was desirable for obvious reasons, as the Senate
Commerce Committee observed:
"The centralized, mass production, high volume character of the motor ve-
hicle manufacturing industry requires that motor vehicle safety standards be not
only strong and adequately enforced, but that they be uniform throughout the
country." S. REP. No. 1301, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966-2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADmrN. NEws 2709, 2720.
57 23 U.S.C., §§ 401-404. The purpose of this Act was to provide a "comprehensive
nationwide program to reduce the toll of death and destruction on our highways."
S. REP. No. 1302, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in 1966-2 U.S. CODE CONe. &
ADmrN. NEws 2743 (1966). Section 401 authorizes and directs cooperation among
Federal and state agencies; section 402 (a) provides for state highway safety programs
"in accordance with uniform standards." Section 403 authorizes Congressionally
appropriated funds "to carry out safety research." Section 404 authorizes the estab-
lishment of the National Highway Safety Advisory Committee.
58 E.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-183.13 through .21. The state legislature found that
"public safity necessitates continuous development, modernization and implementa-
tion of standards and requirements of law relating to vehicle equipment, in accord-
(Continued on next page)
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plex questions of injury-minimization in automobile accidents are prop-
erly a function of legislative and administrative action. The invitation to
a jury to decide questions of design not involved in collision causation
is an invitation to substitute for a balancing of the social and economic
questions involved in such design not only the hindsight and incon-
sistency which would be present in a case by case approach but also
sympathy and speculation. 9
That is why the overwhelming majority of the courts deciding this
issue have rightly held that the duty advocated by proponents of the
so-called "crashworthiness" theory must be a creature of the legislature
and not of the courts.6 0 These decisions have merely built upon the
strong foundation of earlier cases.6 1
The manufacturer is under no duty, absent legislation, "to guard
against injury from a patent peril or from a source manifestly danger-
ous." 62 It is under no common law duty to render a machine "more
safe" when the danger to be avoided is obvious to all.61 Nothing could
be more obvious to purchasers or users of motor vehicles than the
danger of serious injury in collisions. Such consequences are clearly as
"foreseeable" to vehicle occupants as to the automobile industry. Nothing
about the appearance of most automobiles suggests that collisions may
be had with impunity. The responsibility, absent legislation, for any
resulting injuries in collisions not caused by any defect in the auto-
mobile lies with those who drive the cars and cause the collisions.
Conclusion
For sound reasons the great weight of authority rejects as a matter
of law the notion that a manufacturer or seller, absent legislation,
ought to be responsible for collision consequences where the accident
is not caused by any defect or malfunction in the automobile. This
(Continued from preceding page)
ance with expert knowledge and opinion." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-18314(1); that the
public safety required that such standards and requirements "be uniform from juris-
diction to jurisdiction." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-183.14(2). See Enders v. Volkswagen-
werk A.G., CCH PROD. LIAr. REP. 5930, at 8311, for reference to Wisconsin's public
policy and adoption of the Vehicle Equipment Safety Compact in the context of a
"crashworthiness" case.
At least thirty-three (33) states have adopted the Vehicle Equipment Safety
Compact including: Ariz., Ark., Cal., Col., Conn., Fla., Ga., Ill., Ind., Iowa, Kansas,
Ky., Mich., Minn., Mo., Montana, Nev., N.H., N.J., N.M., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Ok.,
Or., Pa., Tenn, Texas, Utah, Wash., Wisc., and Wy.
59 E.g., Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228 (1968), a case rejecting the "seat belt" defense:
"It is possible for reasonable men to analyze logically the variables presented
by the issues of lookout and control, but it is extremely difficult to analyze the
variables presented in failing to buckle a seat belt upon entering an automobile
for normal, everyday driving. To ask the jury to do so is to invite verdicts on
prejudice and sympathy contrary to the law. It is an open invitation to un-
necessary conflicts in result and tends to degrade the law by reducing it to a
game of chance."
How much more speculative would be the case if the jury is asked to analyze the
infinitely more complex variables of general crash design?
60 See cases cited supra notes 5, 18, 17, 21 and 31.
61 E.g., Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 474-75, 95 N.E.2d 802, 805 (1950); Jamieson
v. Woodward & Lothrop, 247 F.2d 23, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
62 Campo v. Scofield, 301 N.Y. 468, 472, 95 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1950).
63 Id.
18https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/16
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view is entirely consistent with the strict tort liability doctrine since
an automobile delivered in a "safe condition" is only potentially harm-
ful in such collisions through "subsequent mishandling or other causes."
Automobiles cannot "possibly be made entirely safe for all consump-
tion," including collisions. Vehicles clearly involve "some risk of harm"
when involved in such accidents. This does not make them "unreason-
ably dangerous" or "defective." The few decisions to the contrary apply
an erroneous test of "foreseeability," which is legally untenable. The
duty contended is so vague and speculative that it cannot be left for
retrospective decision by juries unless the automobile industry is to be
made insurers against any injury. The complex question of auto-
motive safety requires a balanced, uniform approach which combines
measures against accident causation with measures for injury preven-
tion. The Federal and state legislatures have moved forthrightly into
this area with massive funds, research and technological expertise, which
is really the only approach offering the possibility to reduce the acci-
dent toll on our nation's highways.
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